Wyoming Law Journal
Volume 12

Number 3

Article 12

December 2019

The Two Dismissal Rule
Peter J. Mulvaney

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation
Peter J. Mulvaney, The Two Dismissal Rule, 12 WYO. L.J. 276 (1958)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol12/iss3/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

it may well overrule the motion. However, the plaintiff is not limited to
rule 35 in determining the defendant's physical condition; hospital and
laboratory reports and records are available to him under rule 34 dealing
with discovery of records and documents.
If the plaintiff constantly refuses to submit to a physical examination,
contending that such an examination would be too painful or dangerous
and the court feels that the refusal is but a calculated suppression of evidence, the court may order an examination of a party with reasonable
restrictions, upon penalty of dismissal or other sanctions outlined in
Wyoming Rule 37 (b) (iii) . In this respect Wyoming Rule 37 is broader
in scope than the federal rule to conform to the wider application of
rule 35 (a). The sanctions heretofore applicable for failure to submit to a
mental or physical examination apply also to a failure to submit to a blood
test. These same penalties apply to a party who fails to produce his agent
or a person under his custody or legal control unless he shows that he is in
22
good faith unable to produce such a person.
It is the duty of the courts, and it is the purpose of the Wyoming
Rules of Civil Procedure to bestow upon litigants full and exact justice.
This cannot be done until the court obtains the truth touching all matters
in issue, so far as the same can be obtained. Rule 35 is in complete
harmony with the spirit and purpose of the new procedure to bring to
light all of the available evidence without regard to the traditional superstition that any party has a proprietary right to conceal his physical condition from the court. Within the limits outlined here it should serve its
purpose well.
WILLIAM

A.

TAYLOR

THE TWO DISMISSAL RULE
Rule 41 (a) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted
from and is substantially the same as Federal Rule 41 (a). For this reason,
the interpretation by the federal courts of the federal rule is used as a
basis for this note interpreting the new Wyoming rule.
As the federal rule limits dismissals in some instances, so also does
Wyoming now limit them. One limitation is stated as an exception and
comprises the last sentence of Rule 40 (a) (1) .1 This exception has
been responsible. for frequent reference to 41 (a) as the "two dismissal
rule." After stating that a dismissal is without prejudice unless the notice
or stipulation shows otherwise, the exception sets forth that once a plain22
1.

Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37.
Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(a) (1): Unless otherwise stated in the
notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court an action in which service was obtained
based on or including the same claim.

NOTES

tiff has dismissed an action and later started another based on the same
claim, a dismissal by notice of the second action operates as an adjudication on the merits.
Two methods are provided by which an action may be dismissed
without an order by the court. The first of these requires the plaintiff
to file a notice of dismissal before the defendant has served his answer
or has moved for summary judgment.2 Filing of the notice with the clerk
of the court is sufficient to effectuate the dismissal and the defendant need
not be served with the notice.3 The second method is utilized by having
4
all parties who have appeared in the action stipulate that it be dismissed.
This stipulation is a matter of right and may occur before or after the
defendant has filed his answer or his motion for summary judgment.
Dismissal by either of these methods is without prejudice to future action
based on or including the same claim, unless the notice of dismissal or
stipulation states otherwise, or unless there has been a prior dismissal. 5
The exception stated in Rule 41 (a) (1) is worthy of particular consideration as its wording may raise some questions. Since it states that
"... a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits when
filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed......" it will be seen that the
parties may stipulate for dismissal without prejudice as many times as
they wish. The case of Cornell v. Chase Brass & Copper Co.6 furnishes an
excellent illustration of this. That case involved an alleged patent infringement and had been before the court three times previously. Each
time the parties had stipulated to dismiss without prejudice. When the
action was brought on the same claim for the fourth time, the defendant
endeavored to assert Rule 41 (a) as a bar, alleging the three prior dismissals. As it happened in this particular case, the plaintiff in the
fourth action was not the same as in the first three. However, the
court said that even assuming he was the real party in interest in the first
three suits, and that the previous dismissals would operate against him,
this fact would not bar the fourth action because the parties had stipulated that the previous dismissals were wihout prejudice and the rule
7
does not forbid such a stipulation.
2.

Rule 41 (a) (1): an action may be dismissed without order of court (i) by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer
or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs.
3. Silver v. Idemnity Ins., 80 F.Supp. 541 (D.Conn. 1948).
4. Rule 41(a) (1): an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of
court . . . (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared in the action. . . .Contra, Ingold v. Ingold, 30 F.Supp. 347 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), in which a stipulation to dismiss was not allowed because it woud have been
against the interest of the attorneys.
5. Rule 41 (a): Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the
dismissal is without prejudice....
6. 48 F.Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
7. Id. at 981: Assuming that the present plaintiff was the real party in interest in
the American Radiator Company suits and that the previous suits were operative
against him, the defendant has still failed to bring this suit within the scope of the
language of Rule 41 (a).
That rule distinguishes between dismissals by notice
and dismissals by stipulation. A notice or a stipulation of dismissal which is silent
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The phrasing of the exception clause of Rule 41 (a) (1) does not
indicate clearly whether both dismissals must be by notice in order that the
second operate as an adjudication. If the first is by notice, the second
definitely will bar another action on the same claim. There seems to
be a question, however, whether a dismissal by notice following a dismissal by stipulation would be prejudicial. The vagueness of the rule
may be resolved by looking to the philosophy upon which it is based.
The purpose of the rule is to prevent the delay of litigation and to avoid
harassment and expense to defendants by limiting dismissals without prejudice." This would seem to indicate that the drafters of the rule felt two
dismissals by either procedure were all that should be allowed, and that
the second should operate as an adjudication on the merits unless stipulated to the contrary. This would account for the language that a dismissal by notice is prejudicial when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed. If this is the proper interpretation, a dismissal by notice of an
action once dismissed should be with prejudice even though the first
dismissal was by stipulation. On the other hand, the wording of the
Rule, taken of itself, may be interpreted to mean that both dismissals
must be by notice in order that the second operate as an adjudication
on the merits.9 This, of course, is the more liberal construction of the
rule, as it allows for more dismissals. It is supported in a roundabout
fashion by the holding set forth in the Cornell case to the effect that the
parties may stipulate for dismissal without prejudice as many times as
they wish. 10 This interpretation, however, is less effective in limiting
the number of dismissals. Since the intent of the committee that drafted
this rule apparently was to prevent an excessive number of dismissals,
this purpose seems to be frustrated by the latter interpretation. The purpose of the state civil procedure rules is to "secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action.""' Thus it appears this purpose is best accomplished by interpreting Rule 41 (a) to mean that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits whenever
the action has been dismissed previously, whether by notice or by stipulation.
Another problem conceivably may arise from the indefinite wording
of Rule 41 (a) . The rule sufficiently indicates that the plaintiff must
be the same in both cases in order that the rule will apply to the second

8.

9.
10.
11.

on the question of prejudice is made to operate without prejudice. After one
dismissal by plaintiff the rule provides that only a dismissal by notice shall operate
as an adjudication. There is nothing in the rule to indicate the parties may not,
in such event, expressly stipulate that the dismissal shall be without prejudice....
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Osher & Reiss, Inc., 31 F.Supp. 985, 1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1939):
The purpose of Rule 41 was to prevent the delays in litigations by numerous
dismissals without prejudice ....
The case was reversed, on ground unimportant
to this observation by the district court, in 109 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1940) ; McCann v.
Bentley Stores Corp., 34 F.Supp. 234 (W.D.Mo. 1940).
5 Moore, Federal Practice 1016 (2d ed. 1951). Professor Moore feels that Rule 41
should not apply unless both dismissals have been by notice.
Cornell v. Chase Brass & Copper Co., 48 F.Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.

NOTES

dismissal. And the rule has been so construed. 12 However, any mention
of the necessity of the defendant being the same in both actions is omitted
from this part of the rule. In the case of Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co.
v. Noma Electric Corp., 3 the plaintiff had filed complaints three times
previously, twice in a New York federal district court against the parent
corporation, and once in the Maryland district against a subsidiary. It
dismissed all these by notice, the notice each time reciting that the dismissal was without prejudice and without costs. The fourth time the
action was brought, which was the second begun in Maryland, the plaintiff
filed notice of dismissal again. The defendant moved to strike out the
plaintiff's notice, or in the alternative, for an order dismissing the action
with prejudice under Rule 41 (a) (1). The plaintiff urged that this rule
did not apply since the defendants in all the actions had not been the
same; but the court said that identical defendants were not required under
the rule, and it was only necessary that the action had been previously
dismissed in order that Rule 41 (a) (1) would make the second dismissal
by notice operate as an adjudication on the merits. The court discussed
the significance of the different wording in 41 (a) and 41 (d). The latter
subdivision of the rule provides for the awarding of costs of a previously
dismissed action "based on or including the same claim against the same
defendant." Since the language "against the same defendant" does not
appear in 41 (a), the court in the Robertshaw-Fulton case held that this
omission showed that the rule was not meant to be limited to actions
against the same defendant. The theory back of the rules as whole, that
is, fast and inexpensive achievement of justice, would seem to support
this holding.
On the other hand, one of the purposes of 41 (a) is to prevent harassment and expense to defendants -.14 Even if an action had been brought
on the same claim previously, but against a different defendant, it would
be no harassment nor expense beyond that contemplated by the rule, to
allow the plaintiff to dismiss once without prejudice as against the new
defendant. However, reason favors the opposing view as stated in the
Robertshow-Fulton case. An action dismissed a second time by notice
should be barred in the future regardless of whether the defendants were
the same in both dismissed actions. If this construction is placed upon
Rule 41 (a), actions once brought should proceed quickly to trial, and
crowding of court dockets may be at least partially avoided.
The Wyoming rule contains a phrase that is not included in the
federal version.' 5 It is the qualification that service must have been ob12.
13.
14
15.

Huskey v. United States, 29 F.Supp. 283 (E.D.Tenn. 1939).
10 F.R.D. 32 (D.Md. 1950).
Supra note 8.
Wyoming rule 41 (a) (1) reads: a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
on the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court an
action in which service was obtained, based on or including the same claim.
Federal Rule 41 (a) (1) states: a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on
the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the
United States or of any state an action based on or including the same claim.
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tained in the first action before dismissal by notice of the second operates
as an adjudication on the merits. This is within the general philosophy
of Rule 41 (a). If service had never been obtained, the defendant would
have suffered no harassment nor have been put to any expense. The
insertion of this qualification in the Wyoming adaptation of the federal
rule indicates that the framers were desirous of making improvements
where they were necessary, expanding or limiting the effect of the rule
as was thought best. The addition of this phrase strengthens the view
that Rule 41 (a) (1) should make any second dismissal by notice prejudicial no matter by what method the first was accomplished. If the committee had thought that the rule was not definite enough in this respect,
it seems reasonable to assume that they would have rephrased this part
while they were in the process of redrafting and improving upon the
rule. The addition of the requirement that service must have been obtained in the first action is the only addition made, however, and so
indicates that it is the only requirement not stated in the federal rule
that need be satisfied in order that a second dismissal by notice operate
as an adjudication on the merits.1"
The Rules of Civil Procedure severely limit what was formerly a
plaintiff's unqualified right to dismiss an action without prejudice at any
time before the cause was finally submitted to the court or jury. 17 The
plaintiff's right to dismiss without court order or stipulation is now restricted by Rule 41 (a) (1) to the short time before the defendant answers
or moves for summary judgment. Unless the defendant will stipulate to
voluntary dismissal, the plaintiff can dismiss without prejudice only once.
Dismissal of an action for the second time should operate as an adjudication on the merits regardless of whether the first dismissal was by notice
or by stipulation, and without regard to whether the defendants were
the same in both actions. Rule 41 will prevent plaintiffs from harassing
defendants and causing them undue expense in the preparation and trial
of actions that, under the code, could have been dismissed before they
PETER ,. MULVANEY
were decided.
SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES TO JURY
Practice and procedure under Rule 49, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from which the corresponding Wyoming rule was taken, has been
well established since its adoption in 1938. This note is therefore restricted
to a brief historical discussion of Federal Rule 49 and practice under the
16.

17.

If the committee had wanted to make the rule applicable to actions against the same
defendant only, it could have phrased it thus: A notice of dismissal operates as an
adjudication on the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court an action against the same defendant in which service was obtained, based on
including the same claim.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-3505 (1945): An action may be dismissed without prejudice
to future action: (1) By the plaintiff, before the final submission of the cause. ...
For a comparison of the new procedural rule and the superseded statute, see note,
6 Wyo. L.J. 296 (1952).

